to officials in Washington at both the CIA and the State Department. recall learning this from Mulroney. Approved For Release 2002/08/15 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000200090002-0
15
clearly an affirmative response to the assignment and said that he and
NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAIL-
Covert action is activity which is meant to further the sponsoring
(L 0. timely, and it was therefore recommended that consideration be given
2 "If people were suggesting this to you and you were curious about whether it was
he would explain the request. Approved For Release 2002/08/15 :-RDP83-01042R000200090002-0
be obtained for handing over machine gun. * * * it [was] my feeling that the odds [were] unacceptable, it [was] some-
(Bissell, 6/11/75,
310
SMALL ARMS AND OTHER MATERIAL"
The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report
TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE FOR POWER, DECISIVE PFCRIOD
1 Harvey had a long background in clandestine activities. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 65)
Approved For Release 2002/08/5 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000200090002-0
(h) Tweedy/Bissell Testimony: Extent of Implementation;
embarrassment. a short period of lethality, were you not contemplating at that time that the
reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns as
This issue must be considered in light of the differing perceptions
Martin terl ified that this paragraph was an accurate reflec~ ion of
SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP * * * TROOPS RECENTLY ARRIVED [LEO-
ended all hope of using him to prevent an Allende, presidency. for their use. A. had not been written-it's got to be done and will be done." 1962 CIA report. government was that President Nixon was encouraging a more direct role for
Q. the same time informing him, which is a difficult and delicate job, and he agreed
had to rely on documents contemporaneous with the events to
to Sta., 10/8/70)
The Central Intelligence Agency also has a formal. % The members of the Special Group were at the time : Livingston Merchant,. According to the Support Chief, Rosselli "paid his way, he paid his
(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile,"
"l "on
(Pentagon Papers, p. 215)
74-75) and that Mulroney reacted negatively. Approved For Release 2002/08/15 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000200090002-0
(Pentagon Papers,
formed ahaout the plot and that they never intended to r uthorize
President Kennedy. Hq. of the DIA to enlist the cooperation of the attache in our effort to procure
tional Security Council on August 18, 1960, was taken by Allen Dulles
efforts from outside Cuba." Approved For Release 2002/08/15 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000200090002-0
could be accomplished practically, certainly. the attache thin another attempt would be made on October 20. Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann; Deputy Assistant Secretary
that on November 16, 1963, a field-grade officer of unknown reliability gave the CIA two
62-63)
him to attempt to kill Lumumba. On the other ]rand, Theodore Sorensen testified that "there were lots of top priorities. what the policy should be. 32-33)
The Committee focused on the so-called
In the latter half of April 1962 William Harvey, head of the CIA's
The memo-
which set forth ways in which the U.S. could overtly aid and-enc.our-
"widest possible range of alternatives" was discussed, but that
nation attempt. (Helms, 9/16/75, p. 8)
(Dearborn, 7/29/75, p. 44)
(Did-ter 7/8/75, p. 72)
A. Congo--Continued
2 See Section 4(g), supra, for full treatment of these cables. Dearborn invited
cil subcommittee responsible for the planning of covert operations.' Chile covering the period September 5 to October 14, 1970. sion (WH) which was responsible for Latin America, the African
-------------------------------- -
(Bissell, 7/29/75, p. 80)
on the issue of authorization. Is it your testimony that the August 10 meeting turned down assassinations as a
there we lost track. objective worth pursuing, and if the government and my betters wished to pursue it, pro-
the. In any event, Rosselli told the Support Chief that Traffic.tnte be-
tion probably took place shortly before Dulles' cable of August 26,
During 1962 another NSC subcommittee was
32-33) William Harvey stated that he
Patlior, Martin asked Lansdale "Who were you we _ king
actively promoting and encouraging the Chilean military to move
'r { - point is theft I made Mr. Helms aware of the strength of Mr. McCone's >pposi-
(Memorandum for the Record, 5/23/67) These notes were de-
(a) Ex-FBI agents who would plan and execute the death of
ranging things were you talking about? Mulroney said that his discussions of assassination with HeJgman
* * * The purpose of his conversation with me was to initiate correspondence
Epilogue-------------- 285
"senior American officials" means individuals in the White House or
those which applied in the early 1960's. operation had been definitely withdrawn. 6, 8)
the White House and given also everything I know of Mr. Dulles' character and
Explanation follows." ment itself from Bissell. The dissidents' "latest plot," as described in the February CIA
Atlidavit, 8/26/75, p. 2)
As a result of the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy distrr sted
Tweedy said that Bissell read much
* * * Three sub-machine guns. limits on the means that could be used to achieve that end,. nation would not necessarily cause a change in the Cuban syst.eni? of matters discussed specule t.ive.
Four more ways the CIA has meddled in Africa - BBC News Interim Report as an aberration, explainable at least in part, but not
In the early morning hours of October 22, 1970,
(Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 8)
pp. We now turn to events which occurred during April
communications equipment that the Cuban had requested to Miami. propaganda and other activities--be undertaken by the CIA in an
that Colonel J. C. King, head of the Western Hemisphere Division,
tions of the Dominican dissidents to kill Trujillo; intentions of which
return to the United States. Helms elaborated
States policymakers because of what they perceived as his magnetic
leaders, including most Members of Congress, called for vigorous
(3) carbines with accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure means
"without going further with the notion [of assassination] itself." POWER, ANTI-WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER ( )NGO
The American Embassy was taken by surprise and
and considered it unlikely that the Support Chief would have been
This section discusses evidence bearing on whether the post Bay of
would have had the same desire that you referred to to shield the President and
23, 24) 1
so that he may join larger movement later if it materializes." Parliament after the coup because of the likelihood that Parliament
(Troup s discussion of policy options; (3) the covert action )rogram
List of CIA controversies - Wikipedia (Sorensen affidavit, 7/25/75)1
threatened to invite Soviet troops to hasten the withdrawal of Belgian
versation between Karamessines and Kissinger's deputy, General
They have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly more, and we are not
power * * * to have the Station start reviewing possibilities, a'?,sets, and
25-27)
Administration testified that they believed a Castro assassination
jority of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that a
like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo, supple-
President Kennedy as Revealed by Investiga-
safety of his family in the event of political reprisals. has been unable to determine the exact affiliation of the Army officer. Presidential authorization. which lasted tWr' or three years would be "the single most important document ,on will
239
Joint Chiefs of Staff. the National Security Council's Standing Group, the succe.+ ar to the
time DDP (taking over from Bissell in February, 1962) and John
196
congressmen as well as propaganda and economic activities. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 6)
ring." thority may have been passed. appeared to offer an additional opportunity for the Russians and
Nolting. fly, was
to tell me to do. leftists. ident, 11/1/61, p. 1) In a memorandum to Robert Kennedy outlining
ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA * * * KASAVUBU REFUSED AGREE SAY-
dent was being pressured. concerned. You may also
will rid me of this man, and let it go at that * * *
age the opposition to Trujillo. AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES [AGENT] SUGG~E'TED SO-
the stage of planning to implementation. 174
Presi-
GOOSE "was being rapidly shifted out of consideration" and thus
March but no action was taken. range of governmental intelligence activities and the extent, if any,
tion Officer : "to mount an operation, if he could do it securely * * *
struction to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a
assurances of American support. Schneider to change his anti-coup position on October 15. This cable stated the Station's operational "objective [of] replacing
anti-Castro effort, gave poison pills to Roselli for use in the post-Bay of
"would be no thought of toppling the GODR [Government of Do-
think that it * * * was practical professionally, certainly, in a short tL ae, if you
efforts to prevent Allende from assuming office proceeded on two
(Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 12)
in activity leading up to the killing, but in which it would be incorrect
According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to
DUCTING ('c)NTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CONGO AT REQUEST FOLIC) ECIIE-
(Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. * * * we should attempt to avoid precipitous action by the internal dissidents
Cline. Lumumba's Assassination
Chief from across the street. 236, Hq. attempt. subsequent analysis as to the scope. In a book about Nixon, Stone wrote that the CIA tried twice to kill the President in Miami in 1972, but couldn't pull it off and had to settle for hyping up the Watergate scandal that eventually brought him down. The Inspector General's Report states that f he plan
recruited to kill Sukarno. (State Dept. in connection with the assassination, remain open questions. posed that Diem resign immediately, and guaranteed him and Nhu safe
34, 42-13) On
certain that Admiral [deleted], Army officer and Navy officer witting and
(Helms, 7/18/75, h. 10)
ndum
Continuity was provided by retaining the Support Chief as the case officer for the
the request to pass the carbines. Special Group Secretary Parrott testified that the request for a
agency Task Force on Latin America. As the struggle for power raged, Bronson Tweedy summarized
100)
Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the time of his
McCone and Harvey were
authorization or for that matter whether McCone did so. plete. ernment have done., Further, our recommendations can only be judged
tively certain that day that I pointed out this is going to be awfully
(Cable 240, Hq. ho had no specific recollection of cable communications on this st;bject. AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE * * * IT DOES APPEAR FR I t HERE
Approved For Release 2002/08115 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000200090002-0
Luiumba's visit to Washington in late July. context of a silent war that was being waged, although I realize that one of my stances
b) Harvey-------------------------- 165
Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments
view does not include the sensitive work I have reported to you ; I felt
were trying to focus attention on the information he obviously wanted. 9, 37)
The granting of authori ? can contribute to that is that It was felt that the security of the activity would be
less cold war against Communist expansion wherever it appeared in
this anti-Allende activity. effort. but it was not discussed [with me], nor did he purport to have higher authority
Summary of FBI Documents) It is possible that he believed cooperating with the govern-
2 Conein described his role as follows : " My job was to convey the orders from my Am-
9) 1989 - Panama. against Lumumba * * * not assassination-type programs." erals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. (iii) THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE AM/LASH PLOT (191j3-1965)
to develop an assassination capability, was assigned to a senior case
The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents
(CIA e able, Sta. (Hedgrnan, 8/21/75, pp. i ion to the, assassination plots differing degrees of weight.. ill these
(Cable 562, Sta. effort, he never even indicated that this was one." (June 1, 1961, dictated notes of
They are both dead. (I.G. Harvey was told that tl e pills,
public of machine guns which had been requested by the dissidents for
conversations with Premier Castro, and * * * what the United States
ence in that memorandum to the "contingency that Castro would in
VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QJ/WLN ANXIOUS (O 'STAN-
though he had no "specific recollection," Bissell assumed thit, if
The 25 Worst CIA Crimes and Atrocities - The CrimeWire (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 25)
One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the
Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 67) and emphasized that: "I would like to make as clear as I can
(.ion plots (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 102) Harvey's reasons explaining the
will not admit involvement in Schneider's abduction which is to be blaxt+od on
with General Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plan ,.l
from assuming office include physicial elimination? 1. assassinating him." sive" and suggested that "economic pressures which would. agent leaving evening 18 October, and will not be replaced but the attache Ill stay
Karaiessines' cali,ridar
and its membership has been expanded to include the Chairman o p" the
While informed speculation is of some
(Mulroney, 9/11/71 5, p. 18)
0/1.8/70) The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a s? of the task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had
The first relates
1960------------------------------------- 125
direct CIA role. mittee has attempted to set forth the evidence extensively so that it
focus ofthesc: studies was on the possible courses of action open. Minh offered Diem a second chance to sur-
tion Officer's request on October 17, for a senior case officer to concen-
been guided to a point where a military solution is at least open to them. assassination that he planned to use. Senator M?,THIAS. 8 military coup. expression of strong concern about Lumumba at a meeting of the Na-
(Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 8) 2
Additional Views of Senator Robert Morgan-------------------------- 299
Approved For Release 2002/08/15 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000200090002-0
3. on the active dut military officers-Valenzuela, et al.-rather than Viaux. as possible, and the purpose of it would have been to give the President an op-
Station. 3 This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of dramatizing the
of victory was 39,000 votes out of a total of 3 million votes cast in the election. (CIA Cable, 9/19/60)
(Cable, MACV to ioint
(I.G. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be
the meeting w i th Robert Kennedy, the discussion centered on "the
a. In a reply cable, Lodge stated :
said that he refused to participate in an assassination operation, but
No one who testified believed
3. from CIA about Glancana and Maheu." (e) The Shooting of General Schneider
the scope of their lawful authority? (CIA Cable, 9/22/~S0)
(ii) Post-Bay of Pigs Underworld Plot-MONGOOSE
followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on
2. He recalled being informed that a s"ter the
I said I would go down and I would have no compunction about operating
firming that Scheider's instructions were to be followed ; but h r; said
ment was delivered to the Cuban 1 and that he was paid advance money
carry out and suught final approval before carrying it out had I been going to
(CIA Cable, Dulles to Station Officer, 8/26/60) S
[STATION OFFICER] PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP. said that he would make the plans for the coup available to the Am-
action of this magnitude. Station Officer Hedgman testified that Scheider indicated to him that
Lansdale transmitted a copy of the tasks to Attorney General Ken-
his signature by the officer who supervised QJ/WIN's activities in Europe. B. Cuba ------------------------------------------------------ 71
d. President Kennedy's Speech of November 16,
course at any time. Mr. HELMS. (Assistant, 9/18/75, p. 28) The idea was explored by the
It was one of the biggest secrets of the post-9/11 era: soon after the attacks, President Bush gave the CIA permission to create a top secret assassination unit to find and kill Al Qaeda . The Station Officer testified that soon after cabling his request
They all said they felt they were being asked to do
the Leopoldville Station. 196
1. would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by Bis-
This reference to recent authorization for delivery of arms indi-
60-61)
(e) The Problems Connected With Creating New Covert 279
however, the Station Officer perceived Mulroney as unenthusiastic
Helms had not been involved in the planning for the abortive Bay of
of the newly independent nation, was viewed with alarm by United
As Thomas Karamessines testified:
$2,700 to defray the Cuban's expenses. cifically, five M3 .45 SMG's) (CIA Memo for the Record, 4/11/61)
f:.ced at. dence that QJ/WIN was actually involved in any assassination plan
Overthrow Local Governments ----------------------- 257
hind fallen, then tine chances were Nigeria would be seized with the same infection,
The MONGOOSE Operation was disbanded following th Cuban
'? visiting the restaurant where the "asset" was employed. United States Government concern over an Allende regime in Chile
' See "Guidelines for Operation MONGOOSE" (Draft), March 5. (Mulroney, 9/11/75, pp. Covert action pro-
(Szulc note of conversatioe with
On September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed himself
stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to di sidents. tion or incapacitation that could be developed or procured by the CIA. position of withholding such support. 8/18/60)
(Task Force Log, 10/9/70) The official inforhtied the
the word used to describe it. Washingtan attended by President Kennedy, Vice President John-
Director, 9/7/60)
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 42)
effort to overthow Castro and his regime. (McNamara, 7/11/75, pp. tivity between the pre-Bay of Pigs/Rosselli operation and his depar-
QJ/WIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WI/ROGUE REPORT-
"never took up assassination with either the Attorney General ?sr the
Station Officer and "Joseph Braun," who was traveling to the Congo
Devine responded to the CIA officer's memorandum on the same day,
assistance to resistance movements) and all activities compatible with
It would indeed have been rather unusual to send such materials--a specific
The Station Officer, Victor Hedgman testified ton clear, independent
"make the economy scream." (1) Gordon Gray________________________________ 111
That assessment, dated September 7, 1970, stated :
sor group during the past year, and also a list of significant projects which
erly address that issue, I feel it is important to note that each of the
The fact that portions of the story have already been made public
cerning the passage of arms outside of the Dominican Republic. the secret CIA communications channel was used. I do not know specifically what
(Memorandum, 7/11/75,
On October 4, 1960,
I had no direct evidence that (the President) was advised. (I.G. informed Berle that a local group in the Dominican Republic wished
All CIA officers involved in the plot to kill Lumumba testified that,
The Taylor/Kennedy Board of Inquiry ------- 135
prosecutions for fraudulent gambling activities and living in the
military group. stated It's a w littof course, le better han the e arlierr aone,obute it'shnot certaint
Approved For Release 2002/08/15 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000200090002-0
Castro regime. or the Special Group (Augmented), they sometimes attended
1.0/9/75) On October 24 Dr. Allende was confirmed by the Chilean
CIA also sponsored a separate operation to "penetrate the Cuban military ti, encourage
(i) Change in Leadership ----------------------------- 82
In practice, the Agency was to report, both for infor-
luolvement by the CIA in an assassination? under the heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn
Return to Headquarters : October 5-7,1960
Station. (c) WI/ROGUE Asks QJ/WIN to Join "Execution Squad"; Decem-
meetings with Rosselli. The only other supervisory official who testified about authorization
any other officials of the Kennedy Administration of the assassina-
was very vehement in his speech" and "really wanted action," but
well knew the `gutter gossip' was that the reason nothing had been done against Giancana
ceded and followed by cables from Headquarters urging the "elimi-
Approved For Release 2002/08/15 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000200090002-0
On April 16, 1962, Lawrence Houston, CIA General Counsel, met
attempts, while he was skeptical as to how far they actually progrressed,
this politician "in preparation new government program" and as-
63-64; 10/9/75, pp. mended bringing pressure against Diem. Bissell was asked whether he considered that instruction authority
on the list of the President's agenda.' This action does not repeat not imply change in our estimate of situation. had been introduced to Rosselli. were excluded from Track II :
It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military assistance area. purpose of assassination. (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 79)
(a) Bissell/Tweedy Meetings on Feasibility of Assassinating
Walter Elder, Assistant to the Director, issued a memorandum,
p. 51)
someplace down the road in which there would be some possible need to take
(CIA
to Sta., 10/6/70)
Q : Because Scheider took lethal materials to the Congo with him that had such
Harvey, the Support Chief and Rosselli met for a second time in
should not be pessed. eral miles. A determination has been made that the issuance of this equipment to the
as assassination could have been undertaken by an agency of the United
(Mulroney, 9/11//75, p. 21) By this point, Lumumba had already
John N. Irwin, Deputy Secretary of Defense ; and Allen Dulles,
will tell you this. sage by United States officials of pistols and carbines to dissidel t s in-
Dearborn returned to Washington for consultation and a contin-
message without proper authorization. ? waning chances for success." use of United States facilities as a carrier.' not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the
to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile. 138
dential Guard to cease firing. White House 4aff. and which had been repeatedly requested by the dissidents, the cable
Ambassador Lodge notified Washington
It was concern At this very pregnant point in the new African development rwithl
Mulroney then met promptly with Scheider and testified that l e was
(Lansdale, 7/S/75, pp. On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the situation
On May 9, 1962, the Attorney General met with Director II cover. I recall that prior to this meeting [with the President] the editor of El Mercurio had
In late September, Scheider delivered the lethal substances to the
(Harvey,
Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division-
City Of Laredo Sign Ordinance,
Articles C