did the gulf of tonkin incident actually happen

And quite frankly, I follow that rule. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution - Definition, Cause & Significance - HISTORY Hanyok, "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds," p. 46. The Official Line 2nd August, 1964 - Three Vietnamese gunboats approach the USS Maddox and they fire torpedoes unprovoked. In his award-winning 2003 video memoirs Fog of War, he remained unapologetic and even bragged of his ability to deceive: "I learned early on never answer the question that is asked of you. Another reporter pressed the issue, "Do these [patrol boats] go north, into North Vietnamese waters?" In addition, many nations had previously carried out similar missions all over the world, and the destroyer USSJohn R. Craig had earlier conducted an intelligence-gathering mission in similar circumstances without incident. According to intelligence officials, the view of government historians that Hanyok's report should become public was rebuffed by policy makers concerned that comparisons might be made to intelligence used to justify the Iraq War (Operation Iraqi Freedom) which commenced in 2003. Updated on October 03, 2019 The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War . Vietnam was 12 hours ahead of Washington time, so the "attacks" in the evening of 4 August in the Gulf of Tonkin were being monitored in Washington late that morning. The accords called for a general election by July 1956 to create a unified Vietnamese state. Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. All of the enemy boats were heading northwest at about 40 knots, two in front of the third by about a mile. Unlike Captain Herrick, Stockdale had no doubt about what had happened: "We were about to launch a war under false pretenses, in the face of the on-scene military commander's advice to the contrary. [46] Various news sources, including Time, Life and Newsweek, published articles throughout August on the Tonkin Gulf incident. McMasters, Dereliction of Duty, p. 119; Stockdale, In Love and War, p. 19. [13] In 2005, an internal National Security Agency historical study was declassified; it concluded that Maddox had engaged the North Vietnamese Navy on August 2, but that the incident of August 4 was based on bad naval intelligence and misrepresentations of North Vietnamese communications.[5]. The original account from the Pentagon Papers has been revised in light of a 2005 internal NSA historical study,[5] which stated on page 17: At 1500G, Captain Herrick (commander of Maddox) ordered Ogier's gun crews to open fire if the boats approached within ten thousand yards. 132 (01 Dec 2005). But no declassified information had suggested that McNamara, Johnson, or anyone else in the decision-making process had intentionally misinterpreted the intelligence concerning the 4 August incident. 278. Encyclopaedia Britannica presents some key points on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. With regard to why this happened, Hanyok writes: As much as anything else, it was an awareness that Johnson would brook no uncertainty that could undermine his position. During the summer of 1964, President Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were eager to widen the war in Vietnam. Those communications most likely referred to operations to salvage the torpedo boat that had been damaged in the earlier firefight. Three patrol craft attacked a security garrison at Cua Ron (the mouth of the Ron River) and a radar site at Vinh Son, firing 770 rounds of high-explosive munitions at the targets.8 North Vietnamese installations had been attacked four separate times in five days. In early 1964, South Vietnam began conducting a covert series of U.S.-backed commando attacks and intelligence-gathering missions along the North Vietnamese coast. Please refer to the appropriate style manual or other sources if you have any questions. . 16, No. According to Hanyok, "SIGINT information was presented in such a manner as to preclude responsible decision makers in the Johnson Administration from having the complete and objective narrative of events of 04 August 1964."24. 7th August 1964 - In response to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the US issues the Gulf of Tonkin . But what happened in the Gulf during the late hours of 4 Augustand the consequential actions taken by U.S. officials in Washingtonhas been seemingly cloaked in confusion and mystery ever since that night. The event led the U.S. to believe that North Vietnam was targeting its intelligence-gathering mission, and therefore the Turner Joy was sent to reinforce the Maddox. The Gulf of Tonkin incident (Vietnamese: S kin Vnh Bc B) was an international confrontation that led to the United States engaging more directly in the Vietnam War. She spent most of the next 42 years working as a copy editor and editor at Encyclopaedia Britannica. That night proved to be a stormy one. The NSA historian said agency staff "deliberately skewed" the evidence to make it appear that an attack had occurred. Drea, "Tonkin Gulf Reappraisal," p. 5. The North Vietnamese Communist Party approved a "people's war" on the South at a session in January 1959,[17]:119120 and on July 28, North Vietnamese forces invaded Laos to maintain and upgrade the Ho Chi Minh trail, in support of insurgents in the south. Department of the Army. All subsequent Maddox torpedo reports are doubtful in that it is suspected that sonarman was hearing the ship's own propeller beat" [sic]. Hanyok, "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds," p. 3. While Herrick soon reported doubts regarding the task forces initial perceptions of the attack, the Johnson administration relied on the wrongly interpreted National Security Agency communications intercepts to conclude that the attack was real. [1][5] The Maddox fired warning shots and the North Vietnamese boats attacked with torpedoes and machine gun fire. He later said he was concerned that his captors would eventually force him to reveal what he knew about the second incident. [34][5], At 01:27 local time (13:27 Washington time), Herrick sent a cable in which he acknowledged that the second attack may not have happened and that there may actually have been no Vietnamese craft in the area: "Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Both ships began firing at what they thought were torpedo boats, and again they sought air support. He arrived overhead at 2135. Combined with recently declassified tapes of phone calls from White House officials involved with the events and previously uncovered facts about Tonkin, these documents provide compelling evidence about the subsequent decisions that led to the full commitment of U.S. armed forces to the Vietnam War. 22. The admiral added that he was trying to get information and recommended holding any order for a retaliatory strike against North Vietnam until "we have a definite indication of what happened. Documents and tapes released in 2005 and 2006 provided new insights into the 2 August 1964 attack on the USS Maddox (DD-731) by three North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats (above) and established that there was no follow-up attack against the destroyer, along with the USS Turner Joy (DD-951), on the night of 4 August. 4th August, 1964 - Another attack is reported, numbers unknown, but two ships reported sunk by the USS Maddox. North Vietnam did not adhere to an 8-kilometer (5mi) limit for its territorial waters; instead it adhered to a 20-kilometer (12mi) limit claimed by French Indochina in 1936. Even at the time, there was widespread skepticism about the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which the North Vietnamese were said to have attacked American destroyers on Aug. 4, 1964, two days after an . [5] A U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS Ticonderoga, was also stationed nearby. As the evening progressed, further signals intelligence (SIGINT) did not support any such ambush, but the NSA personnel were apparently so convinced of an attack that they ignored the 90% of SIGINT that did not support that conclusion, and that was also excluded from any reports they produced for the consumption by the president. [54] As a result of his testimony, on August 7, Congress passed a joint resolution (H.J. On board the ship, Commander, Destroyer Division 192, Captain John J. Herrick ordered the vessel out to sea, hoping to avoid a confrontation. casualties. [49] U.S. How did the Vietcong react to the Gulf of Tonkin incident? There was nothing there but black water and American fire power." After missions in December 1962 and April of the next year, patrols were scheduled for 1964 in the vicinity of OPLAN 34A raids. The Maddox, on patrol in the area but probably unaware of the raids that had taken place, observed torpedo boats sent out in pursuit of the South Vietnamese vessels and thus withdrew, but it returned on August 1. It is of historic significance because it gave U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson authorization, without a formal declaration of war by Congress, to . McNamara's intentional distortion of events prevented Congress from providing the civilian oversight of military matters so fundamental to the congressional charter. TWE Remembers: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - Council on Foreign Relations None of these communications occurred on the night of 4 August. In the foreword, he notes "Among the many books written on the Vietnamese war, half a dozen note a 1967 letter to the editor of a Connecticut newspaper which was instrumental in pressuring the Johnson administration to tell the truth about how the war started. Stockdale at one point recounts seeing Turner Joy pointing her guns at Maddox. In 1963, three young Norwegian skippers traveled on a mission in South Vietnam. "17, McNamara considered the report, coupled with Admiral Sharp's belief the attack was authentic, as conclusive proof. Maddox suffered only minor damage from a single 14.5mm bullet from a P-4's KPV heavy machine gun into her superstructure. Johnson was guilty of willful lies of omission. "29, During comments to reporters on 6 August, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara lied when he denied knowledge of the nature of the provocative OPLAN 34A raids, which were organized and overseen by his department. 20. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, also called Tonkin Gulf Resolution, resolution put before the U.S. Congress by Pres. When asked by a reporter if he knew of any confrontations between the South and North Vietnamese navies, he responded: "No, none that I know of. On an audio tape from the Johnson Library declassified in December 2005, he admitted to the President the morning after the attacks that the two events were almost certainly connected: And I think I should also, or we should also at that time, Mr. President, explain this OPLAN 34-A, these covert operations. [36], In the face of growing uncertainties over the course of the day regarding whether the attack had occurred, the Johnson administration ended up basing its conclusion that it had mostly on communications intercepts erroneously assessed to be North Vietnamese preparations to carry out an attack and a North Vietnamese after action report. [5], While doubts regarding the perceived second attack have been expressed since 1964, it was not until years later that it was shown conclusively never to have happened. But at 1045, he reversed orders, turning the Maddox back toward the coast, this time to the north of Hon Me Island. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken. On August 5, at 10:40, these planes bombed four torpedo boat bases and an oil-storage facility in Vinh.[44]. They write new content and verify and edit content received from contributors. "[55], The Gulf of Tonkin Incident also had impacts in China, where it increased perceptions among Chinese Communist Party leadership that the United States would eventually invade China. From the point of view of the Maddox, the attack had been unprovoked, though North Vietnam was under the impression that the Maddox had been involved in the raids on Hon Me and Hon Ngu islands. The truth was very different. [5] The Hanyok article states that intelligence information was presented to the Johnson administration "in such a manner as to preclude responsible decision makers in the Johnson administration from having the complete and objective narrative of events." The Maddox called in air support from a nearby carrier, the Ticonderoga. 209217, Adam Roberts, Fredrik Logevall, "Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam" (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 200. [28] Maddox stated she had evaded a torpedo attack and opened fire with its five-inch (127mm) guns, forcing the torpedo boats away. He contended in speeches to Congress that the actions taken by the United States were actions outside the constitution and were "acts of war rather than acts of defense. On the night of 30-31 July, the destroyer was on station in the Gulf of Tonkin when a 34A raid was launched against Hon Me Island. In addition to the difficult detection conditions, the Maddox's SPS-40 long-range air-search radar and the Turner Joy's SPG-53 fire-control radar were both inoperative.9 That night, Herrick had the two ships move out to sea to give themselves maneuver space in case of attack. When his wingman's aircraft developed trouble, Stockdale got permission to launch solo from the Ticonderoga. Some historians do not let the Johnson administration off so easily. Moreover, some intercepts were altered to show different receipt times, and other evidence was cherry picked to deliberately distort the truth. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group, "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 24 August 1964". Still other targets appeared from the east, mimicking attacking profiles of torpedo boats. [25], Daniel Ellsberg, who was on duty in the Pentagon the night of August 4, receiving messages from USSMaddox, reported that she was on a DESOTO mission near Northern Vietnamese territorial waters. [29], Others, such as Admiral Sharp, maintained that U.S. actions did not provoke the August 2 incident. Suggest thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft. In fact, Herrick stated in a message sent at 1:27 pm Washington time that no North Vietnamese patrol boats had actually been sighted. Shortly before Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, he had begun a limited withdrawal of 1,000 U.S. forces before the end of 1963. Codenamed Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A, the activities were conceived and overseen by the Department of Defense, with the support of the Central Intelligence Agency, and carried out by the South Vietnamese Navy. In 1981, Captain Herrick and journalist Robert Scheer re-examined Herrick's ship's log and determined that the first torpedo report from August 4, which Herrick had maintained had occurredthe "apparent ambush"was in fact unfounded. [5], On August 3, 1964, destroyer USSTurner Joy joined Maddox and the two destroyers continued the DESOTO mission. Case Closed: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - HistoryNet The North Vietnamese were oblivious to the confusion it would generate. McMasters, Dereliction of Duty, p. 108. . In reality, McNamara knew full well that the 34A attacks had probably provoked the 2 August attacks on the Maddox. By 1 August, the destroyer had returned to the area and was back on patrol. The three skippers did not know who Meyer really was when they agreed to a job that involved them in sabotage missions against North Vietnam. Hanyok, "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds," p. 13. Updated June 7, 2023 In August 1964, the U.S. entered the Vietnam War based on reports of an unprovoked attack in the Gulf of Tonkin which the president knew were false. [43] That same day he used the "hot line" to Moscow, and assured the Soviets he had no intent in opening a broader war in Vietnam. Hanyok attributed this to the deference that the NSA would have likely given to the analysts who were closer to the event. In contrast to the clear conditions two days earlier, thunderstorms and rain squalls reduced visibility and increased wave heights to six feet. By 0127 on 5 August, hours after the "attacks" had occurred, Herrick had queried his crew and reviewed the preceding hours' events. The Gulf of Tonkin Events: 50 Years Later - The New American According to Edwin Mose, the Hanoi government (which, unlike the U.S. government, had to give permission at the highest levels for the conduct of such missions) probably assumed that they were all a coordinated effort to escalate military actions against North Vietnam. The Maddox and Turner Joy moved out to sea, but both reported that they were tracking multiple unidentified vessels approaching their positions. "[36] In response to requests for confirmation, at around 16:00 Washington time, Herrick cabled, "Details of action present a confusing picture although certain that the original ambush was bona fide. [6][7] A taped conversation of a meeting several weeks after passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was released in 2001, revealing that McNamara expressed doubts to Johnson that the attack had even occurred. [49], By early afternoon of August 4, Washington time, Herrick had reported to the Commander in Chief Pacific in Honolulu that "freak weather effects" on the ship's radar had made such an attack questionable. The vessels appeared to be coming from several different directions, and they were impossible to lock onto. He asserts "I maintain that President Johnson, Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave false information to Congress in their report about US destroyers being attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin. The resolution gave Johnson approval "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. ed. On August 1 and 2, flights of CIA-sponsored Laotian fighter-bombers (piloted by Thai mercenaries) attacked border outposts well within southwestern North Vietnam. naval event, Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of Vietnam [1964]. Morse supposedly received a call from an informant who has remained anonymous urging Morse to investigate official logbooks of Maddox. Gulf of Tonkin incident Facts | Britannica The next day, the Maddox resumed her Desoto patrol, and, to demonstrate American resolve and the right to navigate in international waters, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the USS Turner Joy (DD-951) to join the first destroyer on patrol off the North Vietnamese coast. McNamara again eluded the question, "They have advanced closer and closer to the 17th parallel, and in some cases, I think they have moved beyond that in an effort to stop the infiltration closer to the point of origin."26. Maddox, carrying electronic spying gear, was to collect signals intelligence from the North Vietnamese coast, and the coastal attacks were seen as a helpful way to get the North Vietnamese to turn on their coastal radars. [49] On May 4, 1964, William Bundy had called for the U.S. to "drive the communists out of South Vietnam", even if that meant attacking both North Vietnam and communist China. "CNN Cold War Interviews: Robert McNamara", "Vietnam War Intelligence 'Deliberately Skewed,' Secret Study Says", "Transcript of Broadcast With Walter Cronkite Inaugurating a CBS Television Program", "National Security Action Memorandum 263 - Intro", "Vi som sttter Amerika Norges rolle i Vietnamkrigen", "The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3, Chapter 2, "Military Pressures Against North Vietnam, February 1964 January 1965," second section", "National Security Archive | 30+ Years of Freedom of Information Action", "Deceit and dishonesty: Ben Bradlee's 1987 James Cameron memorial lecture", "Robert McNamara deceived LBJ on Gulf of Tonkin, documents show", "United States Congress resolution, Pub.L. 26. It was passed on August 7, 1964, by the U.S. Congress after an alleged attack on two U.S. naval destroyers stationed off the coast of Vietnam. But he did not immediately call Johnson to tell him that the whole premise of his decision at lunch to approve McNamara's recommendation for retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam was highly questionable. [61], In the fall of 1999, retired Senior CIA Engineering Executive S. Eugene Poteat wrote that he was asked in early August 1964 to determine if the radar operator's report showed a real torpedo boat attack or an imagined one. Washington, D.C., 4 August 2004 - Forty years ago today, President Johnson and top U.S. officials chose to believe that North Vietnam had just attacked U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, even though the highly classified signals intercepts they cited to each other actually described a naval clash . 5-8; Andrade and Conboy, "The Secret Side.". At 2336, President Johnson appeared on national television and announced his intent to retaliate against North Vietnamese targets: "Repeated acts of violence against the armed forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense, but with positive reply. Questions about the Gulf of Tonkin incidents have persisted for more than 40 years. When President Johnson asked during a 4 August meeting of the National Security Council, "Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin?" 5. Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. A few days after the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was passed, he commented, "Hell, those damn, stupid sailors were just shooting at flying fish. TWA Flight 800: NAVAL COVERUPS - What Really Happened The two lead boats maneuvered evasively but were nevertheless heavily damaged. . [49] Even so, the Johnson administration in the second half of 1964 focused on convincing the American public that there was no chance of war between the United States and North Vietnam.
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