one advantage the viet cong guerrillas had was their

They were supported by security forces that ensured their protection, cadres in charge of finances and taxation, and other members whose mandate consisted of ensuring the civilian populations management and control.65 Phoenixs operational control within the districts and provinces was formally vested in their respective chiefs. Courtesy of Ismal Fournier, based on a chart in Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (1966), 30. Though beginning in the mid-1950s as a collection . The NVA operated in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), the Central Highlands, and near the borders of Laos and Cambodia, while the Viet Cong deployed its main force in the populated areas located in South Vietnams lowlands. Chapter 31 Flashcards | Quizlet Lewis Sorley criticized Westmorelands so-called reluctance in executing counterinsurgency in Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam. Moreover, a thorough analysis of Westmorelands papers clearly shows that the U.S. Army general had, indeed, a solid battle plan that aimed to conduct counterinsurgency alongside conventional operations in Vietnam.20 However, proper execution of such a plan was the problem given the threat posed by fully armed Viet Cong regiments and battalions. ProQuest folder 003233-001-0731. In the heart of the villages, RD cadres that would usually dismantle the insurgencys political infrastructure were too frightened to operate in the districts hamlets proactively.50 No elections occurred in the villages controlled by the Viet Cong. Figure 5. Visitors to Vietnam can now crawl through some of the safer areas of the tunnels, view command centers and booby traps, fire an AK-47 rifle on a firing range and even eat a meal featuring typical foods that soldiers living in the tunnels would have eaten. U.S. advisors would be dispatched to advise the South Vietnamese administrators and cadres of the Revolutionary Development (RD) group charged with the supervision of pacification efforts. The guerrilla tactics of the Vietcong were very effective for a number of reasons. Young describes the program as follows: [A] joint venture among the United States military, American civilian agencies, South Vietnamese government, South Vietnamese elected political officials in villages, provinces and in Saigon, and South Vietnamese citizens in villages, religious organisations, businesses, and social networks. As the United States relied heavily on aerial bombing, North Vietnamese and VC troops went underground in order to survive and continue their guerrilla tactics against the much better-supplied enemy. Since then, he completed his PhD in history at Laval University in Quebec, Canada, and retired from the military. Communist losses amounted to 240,000 killed and wounded in 1968, which included many political cadres who were exposed and neutralized during the fighting.51 These devastating losses created a huge political and control vacuum in South Vietnams villages. Finally, U.S. officials continued with their efforts to rebuild South Vietnam's weak and unpopular government. What was one advantage the Viet Cong guerillas had? Start Military History January 15, 2018 Beautiful Waters was a fairly typical village in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. Former CORDS advisor Stephen B. At this point in the war, conventional doctrines and intelligence were used to better support USMACVs counterinsurgents, which drastically improved CORDSs ability to neutralize the insurgency. Consultation of multiple Communist reports written between 1968 and 1971 exposes the COSVNs obsession with the South Vietnamese pacification campaign, which is repeatedly labeled as the strategic target of the insurgency. Colby also stressed the importance of dispatching conventional forces to assist the counterinsurgents in the eventuality of the deployment of large Communist formations.52 Viet Cong the communist rebels trying to overthrow South Vietnam's government Why was there opposition to the Vietnam War? While they timidly acknowledge the efforts of pacification initiatives and USMACVs switch to small unit operations, they mostly ignore how USMACV genuinely morphed its strategy to sync its intelligence and combat operations with the efforts of U.S. and South Vietnamese counterinsurgents. Forces in South East Asia, 19501975, NND 974306, RG 472, entry: 33104, NARA, 3. The initiative was first proposed by Komer and his deputy, William E. Colby, who would become Komers successor as the head of CORDS. Until the end of 1968, conventional forces paid little attention to the counterinsurgents who struggled to accomplish their tasks when confronted with fully armed Communist battalions. The Viet Cong (can be abbreviated as VC, sometimes spelled as Vietcong), officially the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, was an armed communist organization in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.It fought under the direction of North Vietnam against the South Vietnamese and United States governments during the Vietnam War.It had both guerrilla and regular army units, as well as a . That was a w. The cause The anti-communist propagated that VN war was a was against communist invasion but in the majority of VNese view, it was an was for independence. College of Distance Education and Training (CDET), Active Duty Command Sponsored Corporals Course, Reserve Command Sponsored Corporals Course, Research and Sponsored Projects Policy and Procedure, Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, How Do We Learn? North Vietnamese retaliated against a U.S. Navy ship, believing it had helped in the raids. Forces in Southeast Asia, 19501975, NND 003062, RG 472, entry PSG, NARA, 78. By 1940, five or six families controlled a third of the land, and so did the poorest 90% of villagers. Birth of the Office of CORDS: Original Obstacles and Setbacks. Not unlike CORDS, the initiative struggled heavily at its debut. At the beginning of 1970, CORDS achieved most pacification objectives, with 90 percent of the population living in hamlets enjoying acceptable security and 50 percent living in areas considered completely secure.85 During rural elections in 1970, 97 percent of populated areas could vote freely with no significant Viet Cong interference.86 The system worked admirably in Malaya, where the British trained hundreds of thousands of local Home Guard soldiers who were the leading counterinsurgents in the field. Former CORDS advisor Stephen B. Soft powers focused on the cultural outreach of the Viet Cong and the gathering of intelligence on insurgents who operated in the villages.42 Young stated that a good counterinsurgency [campaign] builds partnerships with local communities and their leaders. These partnerships will thrive to become local institutions of self-government, self-defense, and self-development.43 CORDS aimed to achieve these objectives with host nation officials and security forces as the projects main protagonists. Portrait de la famille Ormsby. Throughout the Vietnam War, the Vietcong repeatedly proved themselves to be a formidable enemy, due in large part to their use of guerrilla warfare, something that the U.S. troops were not very . Viet Cong (VC) | Definition, Tactics, & History | Britannica Expose Viet Cong hiding places It was filled with North Vietnamese soldiers who may have excelled at conventional warfare but failed as guerrilla fighters. Given the large geographical area that came under CORDSs responsibility, it would be impossible to outline all the problems encountered by the programs staff in each district. Courtesy of Ismal Fournier, based on a chart in USMACV Office of CORDS Pacification Studies Group, General Records US Weekly Returnexe Reports 1969 thru Plans/1970/Supplements, Phases Etc. It aimed at deploying Marine squads in villages alongside paramilitary forces. They both understood that to gain the initiative and negate the Viet Congs political influence, government officials had to take the offensive and retake the legitimate control of the contested areas. Vietcong military tactics - The Vietnam War - National 5 History - BBC Tunnels were often dug by hand, only a short distance at a time. Richard M. Nixon, Sir Robert Thompson (1970) (2 of 2) Visit to Vietnam October 28thNovember 25th, Presidential Materials Project, folder 102564-018-0215, NARA, 12. Vietnam was a hybrid warfare theater, which required the Americans to fight both the Viet Cong guerrillas and Hanois conventional forces. Marine Combined Action Program in Vietnam by LtCol W. R. Corson, USMC, 24. The invasion failed when entire NVA battalions were mauled by Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers. While the U.S. Marines CAP program was in many ways a textbook counterinsurgency strategy, it lacked this particularity as the South Vietnamese became too reliant on the Marines for support. 1970. Forces in Southeast Asia/Headquarters, 19501975, NND 994025, RG 472, NARA, 12, 1011, hereafter A Study of Pacification and Security in Cu Chi District. Much like CORDS at its inception, Phoenix was plagued by discipline problems. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, eds.. Directive Number 525-4 Tactics and Techniques for Employment of U.S. PDF Tactics in the Vietnam war - WordPress.com Guerrilla Tactics - 917 Words | Bartleby There was a high degree of rivalry and distrust between the Lao Dong (Workers) Party leaders in Hanoi and Communist leaders in the South. Lesson 9: The Vietnam War Flashcards | Quizlet What advantages might guerrillas have in a civil war? Avantages et terres pour les anciens combattants - Le Canada et la Communist political infrastructure in South Vietnamprovincial level, Courtesy of Ismal Fournier. While Westmoreland underlined that he believed in pacification, he claimed that he did not have enough troops to carry out a program similar to that of the Corps across South Vietnam.24 Despite Westmorelands criticism, the Fleet Marine Forces commanding officer in the Pacific, General Viktor H. Krulak, gave his blessing to General Walt, who authorized the initiation of the CAP program in 1965. Ismal Fournier served 19 years in the Canadian armed forces. Vietnam War | Facts, Summary, Years, Timeline, Casualties - Britannica The name is said to have first been used by South Vietnamese Pres. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, CORDS, Central Office for South Vietnam, COSVN, counterinsurgency, hybrid warfare, insurgency, North Vietnamese Army, Phoenix, Viet Cong. While Hanoi and the Viet Cong were allies in their struggle against Washington and Saigon, they still had their differences. To achieve local success, the Viet Cong, taking advantage of the darkness of the night and surprise, concentrated numerically superior forces in the area of attack; it was required by Viet Cong tactics that the guerrillas locally have a numerical superiority of at least 5 to 1; a battalion of 500 men that would attack 100 to 200 enemy soldiers. 1970, box 7, Records of the U.S. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. They used small units to maintain a hold on the countryside, leaving the main urban areas to government authorities. Author John A. Nagl claimed that the U.S. Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency but preferred to treat Vietnam as a conventional war.1 Andrew F. Krepinevich stated that the U.S. militarys approach to Vietnam was unidimensional and that a traditional approach to warfare was adopted in Vietnam with conventional war doctrines.2 Lewis Sorley underlined how U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnams (USMACV) commanding officer, General William C. Westmoreland, marginalized counterinsurgency in favor of conventional war tactics.3 Max Boot branded the conventional war effort as futile in Vietnam and claimed that the Americans defeat was mainly the result of a military establishment that tried to apply a conventional strategy to an unconventional conflict.4 Saturation bombing Herbicides such as Agent Orange were used mainly to. The Americans established a base of operations and initiated a succession of search-and-destroy offensives, forcing large Viet Cong formations to take refuge in isolated areas. In 1969, the number of refugees fell to 114,000 for the entire country.63 During that same year, another counterinsurgency initiative was attached to CORDS. Communist reports also indicated that a significant number of cadres were unable to operate freely or enter their area of responsibility, even after dark. This method called attrition was one of the main reasons the Vietnam War has always been considered one of the most destructive.Dec 14 2016. The Viet Cong deployed combat battalions that attacked and retook control of every village. ProQuest folder 003233-001-0741. About 47,000 Communist soldiers and cadres joined the South Vietnamese ranks through CORDSs Chieu Hoi defector program. The military condition deteriorated, and by 1963, South Vietnam had lost the fertile Mekong Delta to the Viet . At first, Walt expressed his desire to minimize conventional search-and-destroy missions against large Communist units to maximize counterinsurgency operations. Why did US tactics fail in Vietnam? - The Vietnam War - BBC The Marine Corps CAP initiative was designed to avoid falling into such a trap. Much literature has been dedicated to Westmorelands views on how the war had to be fought. Following the full-scale North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam and the subsequent rapid collapse of the government of South Vietnamese Pres. 1775, Hybrid Warfare in Vietnam The U.S. and South Vietnamese Success Against the Viet Cong Insurgency. Viet Cong | Vietnam War | Fandom Abstract: Should the Marines have been more in the background rather than directly involved with the Popular Force in CAP, the program would probably have been through additional setbacks in the short term. . The Tet Offensive was one of the largest military operations of the Vietnam War, and became a key turning point in the conflict. In some areas there were even large theaters and music halls to provide diversion for the troops (many of them peasants) and their supporters. A Study of Pacification and Security in Cu Chi District, 12, 1011. . When the 25th Infantry Division left Cu Chi without leaving a single battalion to support the paramilitary forces, the Viet Congs reemergence was unavoidable. While serving as director of the West Point Military Academy in New York, he initiated a training program focused on insurgency principles and counterinsurgency warfare for cadets. Based on a chart in Background and Draft Materials for U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968. However, given the South Vietnamese Armys poor state in 1975, the prospect of an ARVN victory against fully trained and supplied NVA divisions was hopeless. US/GVN Insp. Corrections? Henceforth, Phoenix would have offices in the countrys 244 districts, with every single intelligence and security agency present to support the program against the VCI. For many orthodox historians, the way the U.S. military waged war between 1965 and 1968 is the norm by which they assess the overall military performance of the United States in Vietnam. Such a decision results in large scale military operations based on flawed intelligence, according to Thompson, which usually allows the guerrillas to avoid contact with the enemy. His fourth and final deployment was in Kuwait in 2016, where he worked as a targeting analyst during the air operations against the Islamic State. They write new content and verify and edit content received from contributors. Jan 30, 1968 CE: Tet Offensive - National Geographic Society USMACV Office of CORDS, MR 2 Phuong Hoang Division, General Record Operation Phung Hoang Rooting Out the Communists Shadow Government, box 4, Records of the U.S. In Vietnam, the NVA and Viet Cong guerrillas both fought for a common political and strategic purpose: South Vietnams unification with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). Moreover, a thorough analysis of Westmorelands papers clearly shows that the U.S. Army general had, indeed, a solid battle plan that aimed to conduct counterinsurgency alongside conventional operations in Vietnam. If the Communists had avoided their costly offensives in 1969, they would have been in a much better position to execute subversive operations supported by guerrilla fighting forces. Marines actions in the villages denied the cadres the ability to support the fighting units by obstructing their access to the population. This explains why U.S. troops constantly had to secure the same area on multiple occasions. A COSVN Directive for Eliminating Contacts with Puppet Personnel and Other Complex Problems, doc. In early 1965, approximately 47 of these Viet Cong battalions were operational in South Vietnam.21 While these units were mainly on the move, they had a highly developed network of campsites and bivouacs that they used as staging areas. When the guerrillas struggle was compounded by the massive losses their regular battalions sustained in 1968 and 1969, they failed in their attempt to rebuild the insurgency by reverting their efforts to subversive activities, an art they excelled at in the previous decades. As technology evolves, so do the tools available to wage war. Communist cadres were rapidly compromised, and Viet Cong units were regularly targeted and ambushed by the Marines and Popular Force. Through the analysis of U.S. and Communist documents, this study suggests that the Americans succeeded in offsetting the Communists tactical approach to hybrid warfare. The ARVN was routed by the North Vietnamese military, which took Saigon on 29 April 1975. During the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong acted as the military arm of the National Liberation Front (NLF), a communist-leaning political organization created to overthrow the democratic government of South Vietnam. Viet Cong leadership further stated that their units continue[d] to suffer losses and remained unable to renew their strength. As for CORDS, its major operational impact on the battlefield against the Viet Cong insurgency is outrageously marginalized. Furthermore, subsequent spring offensives dubbed mini-Tet inflicted more heavy casualties on the Viet Cong. The III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) operated in I Corps and was led by General Lewis W. Walt. Viet Cong - Wikipedia The Strategic Hamlet Program (SHP; Vietnamese: p Chin lc) was a plan by the government of South Vietnam in conjunction with the US government and ARPA during the Vietnam War to combat the communist insurgency by pacifying the countryside and reducing the influence of the communists among the rural population.. The ensuing chain reaction results in platoons rapidly growing into companies. However, the Viet Congs losses against conventional military forces ruined the COSVNs prospect for success. Remarks of Col James B. Egger, MR III Phoenix Coordinator, at Quarterly Phoenix Coordinators Conference, 25 July 1970, box 9, Records of the U.S. Nguyen Van Thieu in the spring of 1975, the PRG assumed power as the government of South Vietnam. Napalm was a very flammable fluid, that would burn through almost anything. In all, at least 45,000 Vietnamese men and women are said to have died defending the Cu Chi tunnels over the course of the Vietnam War. Vietnam was a hybrid warfare theater, which required the Americans to fight both the Viet Cong guerrillas and Hanois conventional forces. From Hanoi, North Vietnamese leader Le Duan closely monitored the insurgent movement in the south through the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), which superseded the Viet Cong in authority and acted as the organizations main headquarters. Phoenix administrators would send a corps of specially trained U.S. advisors to each of these offices to work with the South Vietnamese.77 Moreover, several regular unit commanders sent their S2 (intelligence) and S3 (operations) officers to meet with CORDS advisors. Such a decision results in large scale military operations based on flawed intelligence, according to Thompson, which usually allows the guerrillas to avoid contact with the enemy. As stated by CORDS veteran Stephen Young: A remarkable success in the development of associative power to defeat a powerful insurgency was achieved [with] the CORDS program. The U.S. military leaderships three main strategic targets in Vietnam were the NVA divisions, the Viet Cong units, and the insurgencys shadow government (figure 1). COSVNs Preliminary Report on the 1969 Autumn Campaign, 12, 67. On January 30, 1968, communist-affiliated troops from North Vietnam and the Viet Cong (a distinct political organization) launched what became known as the Tet Offensive against South Vietnam and its American allies. What was one advantage the Viet Cong guerrillas had? - Quora They have their landmarks and never lose their way. Finally, the fourth phase sought to oppose the Communist dictatorship by launching elections in the villages, according to Young.53 Following Colbys briefing, Abrams gave his full approval and support to the initiative, which was also approved by President Thieu.54 The latter took the APC very seriously and regularly inspected the villages with his prime minister to assess the programs progress. As with the CAP, South Vietnamese paramilitary forces and RD cadres choked the guerrillas in the vicinity of the villages. As explained by senior Viet Cong defector Truong Nhu Thang, many southerners were more Nationalist than Communist.13 While directed and supported by Hanoi, the Viet Cong could rely on its whole political infrastructure to oppose Saigon. He then joined the regiments airborne company, part of the 3d Battalion, and deployed to Kabul and Kandahar in Afghanistan in 2004 and 2007.
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